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Запропоновано методику комплексного застосування методів 
сценарного аналізу та прогнозування, представлених графами типу 
«дерево». Розглянуто задачу аналізу ризиків програмних проектів, 
пов’язаних з можливими помилками програмування, що призводять 
до порушення працездатностi систем та програмного забезпечення. 
Спільне застосування дерева відмов та дерева ймовірностей дозво-
ляє генерувати послідовності сценаріїв настання негативної події, 
спричиненої потенційно можливими дефектами або помилками 
в програмах та даних, та оцінювати ймовірності їх реалізації. 
Такий підхід дозволяє виявляти спільний результат впливу окре-
мих ризикоутворюючих факторів (дефектів) на розвиток можли-
вих негативних наслідків (відмов та збоїв) або збиток при функціо-
нуванні складних програмних систем. Це дає можливість завчасно 
розпізнавати та запропонувати ефективні механізми управління 
програмними ризиками з метою їх скорочення та ліквідації.
Запропонована процедура агрегування індивідуальних ймовір-
нісних оцінок експертів реалізації сценарію настання ризикової 
події. Такий підхід дозволяє отримувати групові експертні оцінки 
можливості настання ризикової подiї на основі сформованої сис-
теми випадкових подій в узагальнену експертну оцінку. Отримані 
таким чином ймовірності реалізації ризикової події застосовують-
ся при побудові дерева ймовірностей та розрахунку співвідношень 
ймовірнісного виведення на ньому. Агрегування індивідуальних екс-
пертних оцінок здійснюється шляхом їх комбінування на основі 
математичного апарату теорії свідоцтв та теорії правдоподібних 
і парадоксальних міркувань. Встановлено, що для підвищення якос-
ті результатів комбінування доцільно визначати порядок комбі-
нування експертних свідоцтв та використовувати одне з правил 
перерозподілу конфліктів в якості правила комбінування.
Наведені чисельні розрахунки запропонованої методики комп-
лексного застосування дерева відмов та дерева ймовірностей. 
Одержані результати дозволяють проводити більш глибокий 
аналіз програмних систем та об’єктів, що досліджуються, та 
покликані сприяти підвищенню якості та ефективності управ-
ління ризиками програмних проектів, викликаними дефектами 
в програмах та даних
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1. Introduction
The development of scenario prediction led to the deve-
lopment of two basic instrumental methods. They are a tree 
of objectives and a prediction graph. The objective of the 
methods is analysis of complex systems or processes, where 
allocation of many structural or hierarchical levels is pos-
sible. We build a tree of objectives based on formation of the 
main objective and various sub-objectives, which lie at the 
less significant levels of the hierarchy.
The base of the methodology of construction of a pre-
diction graph is initial implementation of sub-objectives and 
events, which lie at lower levels of the hierarchy with a final 
exit to a main objective. In other words, we build of a tree of 
objectives based on the «top-down» principle and we build 
a prediction graph using the «down-top» principle.
A number of modifications of graphs of the «tree» type 
arose at expansion of spectrum of problems, which use sce-
nario prediction for their solution. For example, a fault tree 
and a tree of events appeared for solution of problems of ana-
lysis of reliability of different systems. We can use decision 
trees as decision-making tools, and we can solve probabilistic 
inference problems using probability trees, etc. However, 
we should note that each of the listed trees implements the 
«cause-effect» principle within a frame of a specific problem.
The analysis of scenario prediction methods presented by 
«tree» graphs shows that the above principle is not taken into 
consideration at performing of several interconnected prob-
lems of scenario prediction. However, there is a «bow-tie» 
method based on the methods of a fault tree and a tree of 
consequences, which gives possibility to investigate causes of 
occurrence of risk events and to analyze their possible con-
sequences in a simple graphical way. This method gives pos-
sibility to establish a connection between causes and conse-
quences of dangerous (risk) events for development of a set of 
measures aimed at prevention and/or reduction of their con-
sequences. However, the method performs analysis of complex 
situations in a rather simplified form and does not give possi-
bility to asses adequately probability of occurrence of a com-
bination of factors, which lead to negative consequences, 
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especially if they are dependent. It also does not make it pos-
sible to reflect a set of reasons that arise simultaneously and 
cause negative consequences (emergencies).
The solution of this problem lies in the integrated appli-
cation of existing methods and means of scenario prediction 
aimed at identification of causes of emergence of risk factors 
and prediction of possible scenarios of development of their 
consequences. In this context, the combined use of methods 
aimed at identification of causes of negative events and pro-
babilistic methods is expedient. This, in turn, makes possible 
to model complex uncertain situations (consequences of 
negative events), generate and assess possible scenarios for 
their development.
For example, we should pay special attention to the risk 
management process when implementing software (SW) 
development projects. It is necessary to be able to identify, 
analyze and predict possible consequences at each stage of 
the software development process in accordance with the 
chosen software development methodology for effective pro-
gram risk management.
There are formal methods of analysis of failure risk widely 
used to predict risks associated with possible programming er-
rors that result in software failure. The most common of them 
are Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), 
and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) methods. 
In particular, we can consider programming errors as causes, 
and software failure as a consequence when applying the 
FTA method. A software failure can cause a number of nega-
tive consequences (risks of software projects), for example, 
additional software development costs, violation of terms of 
delivery to a customer, etc. It is possible to perform an analy-
sis of such effects using a probability tree.
2. Literature review and problem statement
Authors of papers [1–4] consider the main principles 
of construction of scenarios and methods for their analysis. 
Paper [1] defines the ways of using the scenario approach for 
analysis of complex social systems. It proposes general guide-
lines for organization and conduction of scenario studies. The 
objective of works [2, 3] is analysis of modern methods and 
techniques of scenario planning and prediction. Paper [4] 
presents classification of methods and methodologies of 
system analysis. It pays special attention to methods of the 
«target tree» type, methods of expert assessments, structu-
ring and statistical analysis, etc. It investigates the methods 
and methodologies of the system analysis that became widely 
used in analysis and quality management of enterprises. Pa-
per [5] describes the method of construction of «scenarios of 
the future» in strategic management of enterprises. There are 
unresolved problems related to the choice of methods for pre-
diction and analysis of the studied scenarios in works [1–5].
The option for solution of the indicated problem is the 
use of the technique of probabilistic inference based on 
scenarios constructed using probability trees. Authors of 
work [6] use this approach on example of the solution of the 
problem of risk factor analysis of organizational and organi-
zational-technical tasks of ship repair under conditions of 
uncertainty and risk. However, authors do not pay attention 
to the analysis of reasons for occurrence of risk factors that 
affect a course of the ship repair process, which in turn is the 
basis for analysis, assessment and definition of risk reduction 
directions.
We can use a fault tree method as an approach that gives 
possibility to analyze a cause of a risk factor.
Paper [7] considers general problems of using of a fault 
tree method for solution of a wide range of problems in 
va rious fields and its modern modifications aimed at over-
coming of existing disadvantages of the method.
Researchers widely use the fault tree method to analyze 
risks of technogenic origin. Authors of paper [8] propose 
a methodology for assessment of reliability, safety and tech-
nogenic risk based on logical-and-graphical methods of 
ana lysis. They pay considerable attention to the method of 
a fault tree; in particular, they consider the methods of qua-
litative and quantitative assessment of a fault tree, methodo-
logy of analysis of a fault tree with repeating events. Work [9] 
considers peculiarities of application of the fault tree method 
for assessment of the industrial risk of enterprises.
Work [10] proposes an approach based on construction 
and analysis of a fault tree. It makes possible to perform 
computer and mathematical modeling of a risk of a techno-
logical process. This approach gives possibility to identify 
weak spots of a system (an object under study), to identify 
the most likely events and system parameters, which lead to 
negative events.
For today, a fault tree is an effective tool for risk analysis 
of software failures. It gives possibility to analyze causes 
of failures (hardware, software) and their consequences. 
Work [11] proposes the method of qualitative risk analysis of 
software development based on the complex use of the fault 
tree method and the method of assessment of the indicator 
of the net reduced cost of a software development project. 
Author of paper [12] uses the method of a fault tree to analyze 
types and consequences of failures of options of structures of 
information processing systems on the example of analysis 
of duplicate structures with the version-time redundancy.
There is a reverse trend in works [7–12]. There is analysis 
of causes of emergence of risk situations conducted, but the 
task of analysis and prediction of possible ways (scenarios) to 
overcome or reduce risks remains unresolved.
Works [5–12] consider the methods of scenario analysis 
and prediction autonomously, without taking into conside-
ration their combined application for cases with intercon-
nection of problems, which require solution. Only paper [13] 
investigates possibility of integrated application of formal 
methods of specification requirements and reliability ana-
lysis. It considers the method of analysis of types and con-
sequences of critical failures and the method of a fault tree 
analysis on the example of a computer control system of 
motor traffic control. However, outstanding issues related 
to estimation of probability of occurrence of emergencies in 
the absence of accumulated accident statistics (emergencies) 
with a use of a tree failure method remain unresolved. As well 
as determination of probability of the most critical failures in 
construction of a critical matrix by the method of analysis of 
types and consequences of critical failures.
Authors of paper [14] use the «bow-tie» method to analyze 
possible causes and consequences of implementation of risks. In 
particular, paper [15] proposes modification of the «bow-tie» 
method and methodology of partial quantitative risk assess-
ment method. Authors applied and tested it in the shipbuilding 
industry. However, this methodology does not make it possible 
to assess probability of implementation and possible combina-
tions of risk factors, which lead to negative consequences.
Consequently, all of the foregoing confirm the expe-
diency of a study devoted to the search for approaches that 
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make it possible timely detection and analysis of risk factors, 
which lead to possible negative consequences and provide 
a mathematical apparatus for modeling and assessment of an 
impact of adverse events (risks), prediction of possible sce-
narios for development of risk events and study of possible 
consequences.
3. The aim and objectives of the study
The aim of this study is to construct a method for the in-
tegrated application of formal methods of scenario prediction 
represented by graph models of the hierarchical structure on 
the example of the integrated application of a fault tree and 
a probability tree.
We set the following tasks to achieve the objective:
– to develop a procedure for aggregation of individual ex-
pert assessments of possibility of manifestation of a negative 
(risk) event in solution of probabilistic inference problems 
based on scenarios constructed using probability trees;
– to investigate a possibility for an integrated application 
of a fault tree and a probability tree on the example of gene-
ration of sequence of scenarios of occurrence of risk events 
caused by failures of software and analysis of their conse-
quences;
– to run a computational experiment and analyze the re-
sults obtained.
4. Materials and methods to study  
the problem on integrated application of methods  
of scenario prediction
A fault tree is a deductive logical-and-graphical method, 
which serves to identify possible ways that lead to an unde-
sirable event (for example, a failure of a system or a failure 
of its individual blocks). The key theoretical foundation of 
the FTA is the assumption that system components operate 
successfully or fail completely [16, 17].
We use a basic set of symbolic images for a graphic repre-
sentation of the simplest fault tree (Fig. 1).
          a																				b                     c
       d           e          f           g          h
Fig.	1.	Basic	set	of	FTA	symbols:		
a –	input	event;	b	–	interim	event;	c	–	resultant	event;		
d	–	«and»	condition;	e	–	«or»	condition;	f	–	priority	«yes»;	
g	–	exclusive	«or»;	h	–	condition	of	the	majority		
rule	(«m»	with	«n»)
Fig. 2 shows the example of a simple fault tree.
The fault tree (Probability Tree Analysis, PTA) serves to 
analyze a sequence of scenarios (options) for further deve-
lopment of events. They may be the result of manifestation of 
possible system failures with the use of the fault tree [18–20]. 
We form a set of system of random events and probabilities of 
their implementation for this purpose.
Fig.	2.	Fault	tree
Each branch of the tree displays a one-incident event 
from each system of random events (in this case, the system 
of random events consists of two events) and the probabi-
lity (P) of their implementation. We obtain combinations of 
such trees by their integration, which lead to formation of 
a probability tree (Fig. 3), which is a tree-like graph.
Each node (vertex) of such a graph relates to one com-
plete system of random events. A tree branch coming from 
the corresponding node represents each event and proba-
bility of its implementation. Each path from the root node 
to the final position on the tree reflects one of the possible 
combinations of events called the scenario.
Fig.	3.	Probability	tree
We can calculate the total number of scenarios before 
building a probability tree:
N ni
i
z
= ∏
=1
,  (1)
where ni is the number of events in the i-th system of random 
events; z is the total number of such systems.
5. Procedure for determination of aggregated expert 
assessments of the implementation of a risk event when 
solving problems on probabilistic inference
We can use the probability tree as an effective graphical 
tool for risk analysis of software projects. There are two main 
approaches to obtaining of probability of occurrence of a risk 
event. They are an objective approach and a subjective ap-
proach. The basis of the objective method for determination 
of probability of occurrence of a negative (risk) event is accu-
mulated statistical data based on calculation of the frequency 
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of occurrence of risk events. If sufficient statistical informa-
tion is absent, it is necessary to use the subjective method 
to determine probability of occurrence of risk. Its basis is 
methods of expert assessment. In this case, we asses possibility 
of occurrence of an adverse situation (risk) based on con-
siderations and personal experience of a specialist (an expert).
We can engage several experts (a group of experts) to ob-
tain more accurate assessment of possibility of occurrence of 
a risk event. In this case, the task of obtaining of aggregated 
expert assessments arises.
Let us consider the procedure of aggregation of indivi-
dual probabilistic assessments of experts in solution of prob-
lems of probabilistic inference on probability trees. 
Let us assume that there is a set of experts given 
E E i li= ={ | , },1  and a set of risk events R r j kj= ={ | , }.1  We 
assume that R represents a set of independent events. Each 
expert should assess the possibility (probability) of a risk 
event r Rj Î  on a scale from 0 to 1. Or, based on their know-
ledge and experience, experts can present their assessments 
of the implementation of a risk event within a given scale of 
expert measurement.
We can represent the results of an expert survey in the 
form of a set of individual expert assessments as a matrix 
of l × k dimension:
A
a a a
a a a
a a a
a a a
k
k
i i ik
l l lk
=


11 12 1
21 22 2
1 2
1 2


   

   





,  (2)
where aij is the possibility (probability) of occurrence of rj 
risk event, which is formed by the i-th expert.
We get a set B b i li= ={ | , }.1  Its each component is a vector 
of assessments of Ei expert: b p j ki j= ={ | , },1  where pj is the pos-
sibility (probability) of the occurrence of risk rj. 
Thus, it is possible to construct k-systems of random 
events for each expert. It is possible to represent them gra-
phically as a distribution tree. Each branch of the tree reflects 
probability of occurrence of the analyzed risk event.
We assume that we have the given basis for the analysis 
Ω = {ω1, ω2}, where ω1 is rj risk, which is realized; ω2 is rj risk, 
which is considered as non-essential (absent) one. If m(ω1) is 
probability of occurrence of rj risk, we can express the proba-
bility of its absence as m(ω2) = 1–m(ω1).
Thus, for each rj risk, we obtain M m i lj i
j
= ={ | , },( ) 1  vector, 
where m m mi
j( ) { ( ), ( )}= ω ω1 2  is a vector of probabilistic assess-
ments of rj event formed based on the individual Ei expert 
assessments.
We use a mathematical apparatus of the theory of evi-
dences to obtain aggregated assessments [21–23].
The aggregation of individual expert benefits occurs by 
combination of the obtained major probability masses for 
each rj risk event by all experts m m m mrez
j j
i
j
l
j( ) ( ) ( ) ( )... .= ⊕ ⊕ ⊕1  
Authors of papers [22, 23] recommend using one of the pro-
portional conflict redistribution rules (PCR rules) for the 
aggregation of expert assessments.
As a result, for each given rj risk, we obtain a vec-
tor of probabilistic assessments of its implementation 
m m mrez
j( ) { ( ), ( )}.= ω ω1 2
Next, we analyze and calculate the obtained probability tree 
for independent systems of random events with correspon-
ding probabilistic assessments of occurrence m mrez
j
rez
j( ) ( )( )ω1 Î  
and non-occurrence (absence) m mrez
j
rez
j( ) ( )( )ω2 Î  of rj nega- 
tive event.
Authors of [24–26] propose to determine the order of 
combination of expert evidences, for example, taking into 
consideration a degree of difference and structure of expert 
evidences to improve the quality of combination results 
when constructing aggregate assessments.
6. Procedure for integrated application of scenario 
prediction methods
Let us consider an example of the integrated application 
of a fault tree and a probability tree in scenario prediction of 
possible software failures and their consequences.
We assume that a number of systems of random events is 
z = 3, and a number of events in each of the systems is n = 2. 
Then the number of the obtained scenarios is:
N
i
= = ⋅ ⋅ =
=
∏2 2 2 2 8
1
3
.
Here are schemes of formation of all scenarios:
(1): P1 → P3 → P7;
(2): P1 → P3 → P8;
(3): P1 → P4 → P9;
(4): P1 → P4 → P10;
(5): P2 → P5 → P11;
(6): P2 → P5 → P12;
(7): P2 → P6 → P13;
(8): P2 → P6 → P14.
Let us consider three typical project risks: R r j kj= ={ | , },1  
k = 3: r1 – additional software development costs (risk to 
exceed project cost); r2 – violation of terms of delivery of 
software to a customer (risk to exceed terms of performance 
of works); r3 – staff turnover (staff provision risk).
We propose to assess a possibility (probability) of occur-
rence of each risk within the given scale of assessments to the 
group of experts of 5 people E E i li= ={ | , },1  l = 5. Experts ex-
press their judgments on a scale from 0 to 1: no risk (0); risk is 
insignificant – insignificant probability of implementation of 
a risk event (0.1); low probability of implementation of a risk 
event (0.3); it is not possible to say anything about possibi-
lity of implementation of a risk event (0.5); high probability 
of implementation of a risk event (0.7); critical probability of 
implementation of a risk event (0.9); it is clear that the risk 
situation will come (1). Values 0.2; 0.4; 0.6; 0.8 correspond 
to interim judgments between each gradation. Table 1 shows 
the results of the expert survey.
We use PCR5 rule of combination to obtain an aggre-
gated (collective) assessment [22]. We calculate m CPCR5( ) 
combined belief assignment in accordance with pro-
portional conflict redistribution rule PCR5 based on the 
expression:
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m C m C
m X m Y
m X m Y
m X m Y
m X
PCR5 12
1
2
2
1 2
2
2
1
2
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
= +
+
⋅
+
+
⋅
+



Î
∩ =∅
∑ m YY D X
X Y
1( )
,
\{ }A
 (2)
where m12(C) is the combined belief assignment for C = X∩Y 
subset calculated based on the conjunctive consensus.
Table	1
Expert	assessments	of	risk	events	
ri m(ωi) Е1 Е2 Е3 Е4 Е5 m12345
r1
m(ω1) 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.34
m(ω2) 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.4 0.66
r2
m(ω1) 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.29
m(ω2) 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.71
r3
m(ω1) 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.78
m(ω2) 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.22
Fig. 4 shows the distribution trees based on aggregated 
expert assessments. Each of them reflects probability of oc-
currence of a negative event (risk) r Rj Î , which may affect 
implementation of the project.
Fig.	4.	Trees	of	distribution	of	systems	of	random	risk	events
Not only individual risks can affect the successful im-
plementation of the project, but also their possible combi-
nations.
Fig. 5 presents integrated application of the fault tree and 
probability tree for scenario prediction of possible software 
failures and subsequent events, which can lead to negative 
consequences.
There are the following notations adopted on the fault 
tree [27]: 1 – errors in the specification; 2 – errors in output 
data; 3 – deviation from the specification; 4 – false logic or se-
quence of operations; 5 – lack of time for interruptions; 6 – lack 
of time for decisions; 7 – false arithmetic operations; 8 – inaccu-
rate registration; 9 – distortion of programming rules.
«And» logical operations form respectively:
– and1 1 ∧ 2 ∧ 3 → 10 – errors when setting a problem;
– and2 4 ∧ 5 ∧ 6 → 11 – algorithmizing errors;
– and3 7 ∧ 8 ∧ 9 → 12 – programming errors.
«Or» logical operation (1 ∧ 2 ∧ 3) ∨ (4 ∧ 5 ∧ 6) ∨ (7 ∧ 8 ∧ 9) = 
= 10 ∨ 11 ∨ 12 – may lead to a failure of software. We consider 
this as a manifestation of a certain set of programming errors 
on the fault tree.
At the same time, we can consider software failure as 
a cause, which can lead to a number of events reflected in the 
probability tree.
The considered example implies that all random risk 
events are probabilistically independent (the order of passing 
of nodes on a probability tree is arbitrary), Fig. 5.
а
b
Fig.	5.	Integrated	application	of	scenario	prediction	methods:	
a	–	a	fault	tree;	b	–	a	probability	tree
The considered probability tree gives us a possibility to 
form 8 scenarios with the following probabilities of their 
implementation:
P(1) = P1⋅P3⋅P7 = 0.34⋅0.29⋅0.78 = 0.077;
P(2) = P1⋅P3⋅P8 = 0.34⋅0.29⋅0.22 = 0.022;
P(3) = P1⋅P4⋅P9 = 0.34⋅0.71⋅0.78 = 0.188;
P(4) = P1⋅P4⋅P10 = 0.34⋅0.71⋅0.22 = 0.053;
P(5) = P2⋅P5⋅P11 = 0.66⋅0.29⋅0.78 = 0.149;
P(6) = P2⋅P5⋅P12 = 0.66⋅0.29⋅0.22 = 0.042;
P(7) = P2⋅P6⋅P13 = 0.66⋅0.71⋅0.78 = 0.366;
P(8) = P2⋅P6⋅P14 = 0.66⋅0.71⋅0.22 = 0.103.
P P i
i
= = + + + +
+ + + +
=
∑ ( ) . . . .
. . . .
1
8
0 077 0 022 0 188 0 053
0 149 0 042 0 366 0 103 1= .
Given the results obtained, we can choose the scenario 
with the highest probability of its occurrence (scenario 7 
with P(7) = 0.366), that is, the probability of implementation 
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of scenario 7 is 36.6 %. The scenario (2) has a minimal pro-
bability of its implementation under conditions of accepted 
indicators of risk events.
We convert the tree under condition of the independence 
of random events and cause a new redistribution of proba-
bilistic assessments between events. This makes possible to 
analyze and determine probability of implementation of each 
of possible scenarios formed with different combinations of 
random risk events.
It is necessary to determine a priori probabilities of 
implementation of risk events and conditional probabilities 
of occurrence of events in case of existence of the depen-
dence between risk events. We should use the methodology 
proposed in [28] for assessment of conditional probabilities 
based on the expert assessment procedure.
7. Discussion of results of studying the integrated 
application of methods of scenario prediction
There are a number of instrumental methods of scenario 
analysis and prediction created for now. Various tree-like 
graphs represent them. The objective of each of these me-
thods is solution of a specific prediction problem and it 
does not take into consideration possible presence of several 
interrelated problems, which determine a general problem. 
The studied approach of integrated application of scenario 
prediction methods gives possibility to perform deeper ana-
lysis of systems and objects under study.
The integrated use of the fault tree method and the 
probability tree method is an effective tool for analysis of 
possible scenarios for further development of events, which 
are consequences of failure of a software system. Such fai-
lures are reasons for violation of functionality and security of 
implementation of the main functions of a software system. 
The scenarios built in this way give possibility to identify 
possible risk events caused by system failures, which can lead 
to catastrophic consequences with significant damage in real 
complex software systems. The advantage of the proposed 
methodology is the ability to determine probability of imple-
mentation of a scenario based on a group expert assessment. 
The peculiarity of the approach lies in the fact that it makes 
possible to process experts’ assessments generated under 
uncertainty (for example, an expert cannot assess possibility 
of occurrence of a risk), as well as contradictory and incon-
sistent expert judgments. The use of the combination mecha-
nism for aggregation of individual expert assessments based 
on the mathematical apparatus of the theory of evidences 
and the theory of plausible and paradoxical reasoning makes 
possible to achieve such advantages.
We should note limitations imposed on a number of sys-
tems of random events analyzed when constructing a proba-
bility tree as a disadvantage. There is an exponential increase 
in its size and, consequently, in a series of possible scenarios 
with an increase in a number of analyzed systems of random 
events, especially if a number of events in such systems are 
significant. It is advisable to use a probability tree if a series 
of random events do not exceed 4.
It is possible to use the proposed approach as an add-on 
to existing methods of risk analysis for software projects, 
where the main cause of risks are defects in hardware and 
software, data or computing processes.
For example, we assess possibility of implementation of 
an adverse event (risk) and its impact on a project in the 
process of qualitative risk analysis. As a result, we get a list 
of risks ranked by a degree of their impact on a project and 
a risk map. It is possible to perform the risk ranking based 
on «probability/consequence» matrix analysis, according to 
the PMBOK standard. If a group of experts of the corres-
ponding profile determines possibility of risk implementation 
based on subjective probabilities, we can form the collective 
assessment based on the proposed procedure of aggregation 
of individual probabilistic expert assessments.
Another example is a common sharing of the proposed 
methodology for generation of a succession of negative event 
scenarios and analysis of sensitivity of individual risk factors 
to deviations of system parameters. The approach makes 
possible identification of risk factors, which have the greatest 
impact on project implementation.
It is possible to apply the offered methodology under 
conditions of use of modern flexible methods of software 
development. The development of technology management 
software projects led to emergence of flexible and adaptive 
software development methodologies. The objective of the 
most of them is minimization of risks by reduction of deve-
lopment to a certain number of short iteration cycles, each of 
which should end with generation of the next interim version 
of software. Speaking about the class of iterative software 
development models, we can note that it is possible to ap-
ply the proposed approach at the stage of testing of current 
prototype software. This application will give possibility to 
analyze an impact of risks of possible failures (identification 
of their causes and consequences) on the state of a software 
development process.
The possible objective for further research is develop-
ment of methods for improvement of the quality of the 
obtained expert information and exploring the possibility of 
using of Bayesian networks to analyze a sequence of scenarios 
for development of a negative event.
8. Conclusions
1. We have proposed in this study to use the combination 
mechanism based on one of the rules from the theory of evi-
dence or the theory of plausible and paradoxical reasoning 
for the aggregation of individual expert assessments of a pos-
sibility of the occurrence of a risk event. We determined that 
we could obtain more effective results of combination if we 
use conflict redistribution rules. The establishment of the 
order of combination of expert evidences gave possibility to 
improve the quality and accuracy of the combination results. 
The approach makes it possible not to ignore and not to lose 
expert information obtained based on non-coincident and 
contradictory expert evidences.
2. We investigated the possibility of integrated applica-
tion of formal methods of scenario prediction, namely a fault 
tree and a probability tree. The proposed method of integra-
ted application of a fault tree and a probability tree gives 
a possibility to analyze sequences of scenarios of manifesta-
tion of a risk event caused by accidental negative influences 
of possible failures of functioning of a technical, software 
system, or its individual elements. It enables to identify 
risks in advance and to predict consequences of their impact 
on safe operation of a system, to offer effective and timely 
mechanisms for their management and to improve control 
and monitoring of possible threats. This, in turn, gives a pos-
sibility to improve performance and quality of operation of 
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technical and software systems and to reduce the potential 
financial loss associated with implementation of a risk event.
3. We presented the examples of practical implementa-
tion of the proposed methodology for the integrated appli-
cation of a fault tree and a probability tree on the example of 
solution of the problem of risk analysis of software projects 
caused by failures in functioning of software and systems. 
The obtained practical results are intended to identify and 
analyze potentially possible defects in programs and data in 
a timely manner at the stages of design and implementation 
or in case of violation of the technology of implementation 
of a program project. Their application gives possibility to 
correct prediction of occurrence of a risk event associated 
with possible software failures promptly in order to apply ef-
fective methods and means to reduce risks and minimize the 
associated effects of their negative impact on all stages of the 
life cycle of software systems. This, in turn, helps to increase 
reliability of software systems due to identification of hidden 
errors and defects and analysis of possible scenarios of their 
impact on the quality of a product.
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Актуальність роботи обумовлена важливістю і необхід-
ністю уніфікації побудови і використання інтелектуальних 
систем підтримки рішень для управління складними промисло-
вими об’єктами та системами.
Метою роботи є обґрунтування єдиного підходу до управ-
ління базами знань різних конфігурацій і розробка уніфікованих 
математичних моделей операцій над елементами онтологій. 
Запропоновано метод управління еволюцією онтологій про-
фесійних областей, заснований на уніфікації структурно-логіч-
ної моделі репрезентації метазнань.
Розроблено спосіб уніфікації структурно-логічної моделі 
еволюції інкорпорації онтологій. Розроблено формально-лінг-
вістичні моделі, доведено подібність форм репрезентації знань 
і еволюційне спадкування в рамках загальної інкорпорації онто-
логій. Для синтезу моделі інкорпорації еволюційного успадку-
вання онтологій вирішені завдання розробки моделей еволю-
ційного успадкування концептів, графів і онтологій рівнів БЗ. 
Модель забезпечує можливість для всіх рівнів БЗ єдиного підхо-
ду до інтерпретації структур взаємодії концептів.
Розроблено узагальнену модель сигнального графа рівнів 
структури БЗ. Модель включає в себе атомарний концепт, сиг-
нал, потенціал вузла, активність вузла, поріг чутливості вузла 
до вхідного сигналу. Розроблено набір формальних моделей 
множини базових операцій на сигнальному графі БЗ, необхідних 
для інтерпретації та обчислення форм знань. Розроблено син-
таксис метаправил і формально-лінгвістичний базис. Введено 
формалізми параметра маркування та функції маркування 
сигнального графа БЗ. Моделі маркування введені в загальну 
модель сигнального графа БЗ. 
Досліджено можливості застосування розроблених моде-
лей сигнального графа бази знань в різних професійних галу-
зях. Показано, що запропоновані моделі метазнань не зале-
жать від форм подання і формалізмів професійних онтологій. 
Це дозволяє використовувати єдиний механізм управління 
знаннями в будь-яких інтелектуальних системах підтримки 
рішень. Запропоновано спосіб ефективного динамічного управ-
ління структурою всіх рівнів БЗ і процесом логічного висновку 
в залежності від вхідних параметрів функціонування інтелек-
туальної системи
Ключові слова: інкорпорація онтологій, контекст моделі, 
маркування графа, метапродукція, репрезентація знань, сиг-
нальний граф, система підтримки рішень
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1. Introduction
At the present stage of development of automated control 
systems for large industrial facilities, aspects of management 
in crisis situations with a lack of time are of particular im-
portance. These situations are usually called crisis due to the 
significant amount of damage that occurs in a very limited 
period of time. In this regard, the period of time for making 
